About me

I am a 4th year PhD student in Economics at Stanford GSB. I am interested in mechanism design, in particular multidimensional screening and redesigning social programs. I have recently been working on mechanisms allocating goods through waitlists. You can reach me at tokarski (at) stanford [dot] edu. My CV is here.

Publications

Incentive separability

with Piotr Dworczak, Paweł Doligalski, Joanna Krysta.
Journal of Political Economy: Microeconomics.

Working papers

Strategically analogous mechanisms

with Joey Feffer.
Accepted for presentation at EC 2026.

Targeting without transfers

Accepted for presentation at EC 2026.

Screening with damages and ordeals

Accepted for presentation at EC 2026.

Equitable screening

Presented at EC 2025. Slides available here.

Short notes

A market-design response to the European energy crisis

with Scott Duke Kominers, Mohammad Akbarpour and Piotr Dworczak.

Ironing without concavification